@manuascript {716226, title = {Approval Regulation for Frontier Artificial Intelligence: Pitfalls, Plausibility, Optionality}, year = {Working Paper}, abstract = { Observers and practitioners of artificial intelligence (AI) have conjectured the possibility of catastrophic risks associated with its emergence and development, risks that have led some to propose an FDA-style licensing regime for AI. In this essay I explore the applicability of approval regulation {\textendash} that is, a model of product intro- duction that combines experimental minima with government licensure conditioned partially or fully upon that experimentation {\textendash} to the regulation of frontier AI. There are a number of reasons to believe that approval regulation, simplistically applied, would be inapposite for frontier AI risks. Domains of weak fit include the difficulty of defining the regulated {\textquotedblleft}product,{\textquotedblright} the presence of Knightian uncertainty or deep ambiguity about harms from AI, the potentially transmissible nature of risks, and the potential for massively distributed production of foundation models with min- imal observability of production. I consider four themes for future theoretical and empirical research: (1) the proper mix of approval regulation and other models such as liability or intellectual property regimes; (2) the possibility that deep ambigu- ity or Knightian uncertainty may require a kind of speculative pathology in which conjecturing scenarios is at least as important as placing probabilities upon them, in part because of the Lucretius problem; (3) the likely structure of industry and foundation-model generation, as the feasibility of approval regulation is higher with fewer producers, and much of the future of AI regulation may consist in labs and models monitoring one another; and (4) the possibility of community option value in the incremental development of AI regulation (including approval regulation), as regulatory policies may be more reversible in AI than in other settings, experimen- tation generates important public goods, and regulatory learning by doing is likely to be a property of any portfolio of policies in this arena. }, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @workingpaper {716486, title = {Empire, Ministry, Indigeneity}, year = {In Press}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {716216, title = {Lawyers as Lobbyists: Regulatory Advocacy in American Finance}, journal = {Perspectives on Politics}, year = {In Press}, abstract = { Administrative agencies have undertaken an increasingly substantial role in policymaking. Yet the influence-seeking that targets these agencies remains poorly understood. Reporting exceptions under the Lobbying Disclosure Act allow many of the most powerful advocates to characterize their activity as lawyering, not lobbying, and thereby fly under the radar. Using agency-generated records on lobbying activity, financial reporting, and personnel databases specific to lawyers, as well as LinkedIn, we describe a vast subterranean world of regulatory influence-seeking that the social-science literature has (mostly) ignored. Regulatory lobbying is systematically different from legislative lobbying. It involves different kinds of people and different lobbying firms that bring specific forms of expertise and distinct networks. Our key findings about how regulatory lobbying differs include the following: (1) the regulatory lobbying sector is highly segregated from the reported lobbying sector, with many regulatory advocates failing to consistently register or report earnings commensurate with their activity level, (2) the number of unregistered regulatory advocates working on the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act plausibly exceeds 150\% of the registered lobbyists working on that law, (3) the most effective regulatory lobbyists and law firms involved with regulatory lobbying have incomes that dramatically outpace leading reported lobbying firms (which are also mostly law firms), and (4) back-of-the-envelope calculations and more sophisticated decomposition regressions imply that aggregate expenditure on lawyer-lobbying is several multiples of reported lobbying spending. We introduce the case of a particular lawyer-lobbyist and provide a theoretical discussion to situate and contextualize these findings. Collectively, this work opens a window into neglected domains of politics and reveals an important and understudied form of political inequality. }, url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/lawyers-as-lobbyists-regulatory-advocacy-in-american-finance/D6C046236F1F997C0C6E75FC608954D4}, author = {Brian Libgober and Daniel Carpenter} } @article {716456, title = {Securing the Trustworthiness of the FDA to Build Public Trust in Vaccines}, journal = {The Hastings Center report}, volume = {53}, number = {S2}, year = {2023}, pages = {S60-S68}, abstract = { The Covid-19 pandemic highlighted the need to examine public trust in the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) vaccine approval process and the role of political influence in the FDA{\textquoteright}s decisions. Ensuring that the FDA is itself trustworthy is important for justifying public trust in its actions, like vaccine approvals, thereby promoting public health. We propose five conditions of trustworthiness that the FDA should meet when it reviews vaccines, even during emergencies: consistency with rules, proper expert or political decision-makers, proper decision-making and noninterference, connection to public preference, and transparency of both reasons and procedures. The five conditions provide a roadmap of procedural and substantive requirements, which the FDA has variably implemented, focused on ensuring appropriate influence of political interests. While being a trustworthy agency cannot guarantee the public{\textquoteright}s trust, implementing these conditions build a groundwork for public trust. }, url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/hast.1525?af=R}, author = {Leah Z. Rand and Daniel Carpenter and Aaron S. Kesselheim and Bhaskar, Anushka and Jonathan J. Darrow and William B. Feldman} } @article {711326, title = {Just How Much of History is Countable?}, journal = {Political Science Quarterly}, year = {2023}, abstract = {How can historical perspective be brought to the quantitative social sciences? The question has proven immensely popular, but answers that deal squarely with historical context and narrative remain elusive. An important recent book by Gregory Wawro and Ira Katznelson{\textemdash}Time Counts{\textemdash}provides an important new direction and a kit of useable tools. Using Wawro and Katznelson{\textquoteright}s approach and methods puts social scientists in a better position to appreciate the historicity of their data and to avoid common errors in statistical execution and inference.\ Time Counts\ also raises questions every bit as vital as those it answers, especially when it comes to the boundaries between narrative and quantitative work. An important concern is that inference from a particular historical setting (or what I call a {\textquotedblleft}regime{\textquotedblright}) cannot be reduced to a special case of inference from large-sample statistics. Historical judgment is at least partially incommensurable with the idea of probability, cases are often important precisely because they are not countable, and scientific rigor may demand avoiding quantification for part of the social scientist{\textquoteright}s approach.}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {711321, title = {Agenda Democracy}, journal = {Annual Review of Political Science}, volume = {26}, year = {2023}, pages = {193-212}, abstract = { The study of agenda setting has become curiously disconnected from democratic theory and democratization. Following Schattschneider, Dahl, and recent developments in political theory, I call for its reintegration in theoretical and empirical realms. The concept of agenda democracy allows for better understanding of contests over institutions, significant historical-institutional transformations, the study of inequality and its mechanisms of generation and maintenance, and the building and undermining of democracy. Agenda democracy requires a broad understanding of agendas (beyond a mere menu of final policy choices), recognizes that many democratic regimes have institutions that systematically render agendas nondemocratic, and compels us to look at the interstices of institutions and society (party transformation, petition and grievance mechanisms, advocacy campaigns, initiatives to expand what I call the shortlist of the possible) for moments of significant change. Agenda democracy compels the examination of democratizing agenda restrictions, the study of conservative organizations in politics, and the consideration of decomposing the term {\textquotedblleft}movement.{\textquotedblright} }, url = {https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051921-102533}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {696218, title = {Strategic Realism, not Optimism: Bayesian and Indigenous Perspectives on the Democratizing Petition}, journal = {Social Science History}, year = {2022}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2022.37} } @article {696217, title = {Strategic Realism, not Optimism: Bayesian and Indigenous Perspectives on the Democratizing Petition}, journal = {Social Science History}, year = {2022}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2022.37} } @webarticle {689277, title = {The Petition between Lobbying and Litigating (Balkinization Response to Levinson and Suk)}, year = {2022} } @webarticle {689276, title = {Petitioning, Strategy and Agenda Democracy (Balkinization Response to Frances Lee and Robert Tsai)}, year = {2022} } @manuascript {671940, title = {Scholarship and Office: Some Thoughts on the Academic Freedom Alliance}, year = {2022} } @article {669759, title = {The Popular Origins of Legislative Jurisdictions: Petitions and Standing Committee Formation in Colonial Virginia and the Early U.S. House}, journal = {Journal of Politics}, volume = {84}, number = {3}, year = {2022}, pages = {1727-1745}, abstract = {Committee formation in early American legislatures happened when those assemblies were inundated with petitions, a relationship unexamined in institutional political science. We develop a model where a floor creates committees to respond to topic-specific petitions, predicting committee creation when petitions (1) are topically specific, (2) are spread across constituencies, and (3) have complex subject matter, and predicting committee appointments from petition-heavy constituencies. Analysis of case studies and with two original datasets {\textendash} petitions sent to the Virginia House of Burgesses from 1766 to 1769, and over 100,000 petitions sent to Congress and recorded in the House Journal (1789-1875) {\textendash} shows petitions, their complexity and their geographic dispersion predict committee creation. Our theoretical argument embeds asset specificity in legislative institutions, and helps reinterpret the entropy of political agendas and the origins of standing committees in American legislatures.}, url = {https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/716285?casa_token=_t6Uae6mGfAAAAAA:kq4QbbGT3PdW1JdtyCoQ2ZSuFgK0lGvYDTXCJbCRJjfDRwWktozCXtykKbkJx-dfbV_bLxk_vgg}, author = {Benjamin Schneer, Tobias Resch, Maggie Blackhawk, Daniel Carpenter} } @book {8982, title = {Democracy by Petition: Popular Politics in Transformation, 1790-1870}, year = {2021}, note = {Manuscript under preparation for W. W. Norton{\textquoteright}s Issues in American Democracy series.}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, organization = {Harvard University Press}, address = {Cambridge, Mass.}, url = {https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674247499}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {669761, title = {Congressional Representation by Petition: Assessing the Voices of the Voteless in a Comprehensive New Database, 1789{\textendash}1949}, journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly}, year = {2020}, abstract = {For much of American political history, the electoral franchise was restricted to only a portion of the population. By contrast, the right to petition was considered universal and enshrined in the First Amendment, giving voice to the voteless. Petitioning thus served as a fundamental mechanism of representation. Still, fundamental questions remain: How was petitioning used, how did Congress respond to petitions, and did the petition allow for partial representation of the marginalized and unenfranchised? We address these questions by analyzing the Congressional Petitions Database (CPD), an original endeavor tracking virtually every petition introduced to Congress from 1789 to 1949. Our analyses document how (1) two important groups of unenfranchised constituents{\textemdash}Native Americans and women{\textemdash}petitioned regularly and (2) Congress{\textquoteright}s initial treatment of Natives{\textquoteright} and women{\textquoteright}s petitions was similar to that of all others, thus offering systematic evidence highlighting the petition{\textquoteright}s role as a mechanism for representation among otherwise unenfranchised groups.}, url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/lsq.12305}, author = {Maggie Blackhawk and Daniel Carpenter and Tobias Resch and Benjamin Schneer} } @workingpaper {661067, title = {Authoritarian Electoral College Underpopulation: Historical Reflections and a Possible Countermove under Article I, Section 5}, year = {2020}, abstract = { The possibility of a contested presidential election in November 2020 to January 2021 is real, and\ one of the most common scenarios (discussed in a widely shared Newsweek article and by the legal\ scholar Lawrence Lessig) involves states refusing to certify or report slates of electors to the\ Electoral College with the result (and, in all likelihood, the intent) of throwing the election to the\ House of Representatives. I call this scenario authoritarian Electoral College underpopulation. In this memorandum, I advance two points. First, neither Article II nor the Twelfth Amendment\ was designed for such scenarios, being rather intended for situations where multi-candidate or\ multiparty dynamics lead to no single candidate gaining a majority in the College (as occurred in\ 1800 and in 1824). Absent a multi-candidate scenario where no third candidate materializes, or\ absent an Electoral College tie, no contingent vote of the House should occur, because states should\ faithfully report their Electoral College slates in keeping with republican principles, that is, state\ popular majorities. Second, I then argue that the House of Representatives could respond by reconfiguring its members\ using its powers under Article I, Section 5, with a combination of selective delegation seating or\ selective delegation reconstitution, to produce in the House contingent vote the result that would have\ been produced by a legitimate (republican) Electoral College vote and/or the national popular vote. While Article I, Section 5 powers are subject to abuse, they could be used under extreme\ circumstances to rectify unrepublican actions among state authorities. Indeed, some such Section 5\ powers have been used before in a similar corrective manner, to counter unrepublican actions at the\ state level. While reform of our Electoral College institutions is a more desirable {\textquotedblleft}first-best{\textquotedblright}\ aspiration, this argument points to ways of protecting the republican principle in near-term\ presidential elections. }, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {446196, title = {The Contours of American Congressional Petitioning, 1789-1949: A New Database}, year = {2020}, abstract = {We introduce the Congressional Petitions Database (CPD), an original endeavor tracking virtuallyevery petition introduced to Congress from 1789 to 1949. Exploiting Congress{\textquoteright}s ritual reading ofpetition prayers, we leverage a supervised machine learning algorithm to create a database comprisingover 537,000 petitions. For each petition we code the prayer and its subject matter, geographic origin,initial disposition and other information. Initial analyses suggest that (1) per-capita petitioning peakednationwide in the mid- and late-nineteenth century and remained at higher levels until World War I,declining appreciably thereafter; (2) the South exhibits lower petitioning from 1802 to 1870 (but notbefore 1800), cratering in the 1840s through 1860s and again later in the Jim Crow Era; and (3) theunenfranchised petitioned regularly and their petitions were afforded process similar to all others. TheCPD will be useful for studies of legislative development, social movements, interest group advocacy, federalism and sectionalism.}, author = {Maggie Blackhawk and Daniel Carpenter and Tobias Resch and Benjamin Schneer} } @article {646517, title = {La r{\'e}putation organisationnelle de l{\textquoteright}{\'E}tat f{\'e}d{\'e}ral dans un contexte g{\'e}n{\'e}ral de malaise politique}, journal = {Revue fran{\c c}aise d{\textquoteright}administration publique}, volume = {170}, number = {2}, year = {2019}, pages = {385-396}, abstract = {Apr{\`e}s un demi-si{\`e}cle de critique presque continuelle, les organes qui composent l{\textquoteright}{\'E}tat f{\'e}d{\'e}ral aux {\'E}tats-Unis souffrent aujourd{\textquoteright}hui d{\textquoteright}un profond malaise en termes de r{\'e}putation. La loyaut{\'e} des citoyens, les marques de respect social, l{\textquoteright}attractivit{\'e} en ce qui concerne le recrutement de jeunes fonctionnaires, tous ces {\'e}l{\'e}ments positifs de la relation des Am{\'e}ricains {\`a} l{\textquoteright}{\'E}tat f{\'e}d{\'e}ral semblent disparaitre. En m{\^e}me temps, on constate que certaines agences f{\'e}d{\'e}rales jouissent d{\textquoteright}une meilleure r{\'e}putation que d{\textquoteright}autres. Pendant un moment, au cours de la crise financi{\`e}re et {\'e}conomique de 2007-2008, certaines d{\textquoteright}entre elles ont m{\^e}me b{\'e}n{\'e}fici{\'e} d{\textquoteright}un regain de popularit{\'e}. Quelles le{\c c}ons pouvons-nous tirer de cette {\'e}volution\ ? En ce qui concerne la p{\'e}riode actuelle, faut-il s{\textquoteright}attendre {\`a} une renaissance des attentes du citoyen {\`a} leur {\'e}gard, ou m{\^e}me une r{\'e}action du\ deep state\ face aux critiques des tenants de M. Bannon et du Pr{\'e}sident Trump\ ? Ou bien la soci{\'e}t{\'e} am{\'e}ricaine est-elle condamn{\'e}e {\`a} la constante d{\'e}t{\'e}rioration de l{\textquoteright}image des organisations qui composent l{\textquoteright}{\'E}tat f{\'e}d{\'e}ral\ ? Le pr{\'e}sent article montre que la d{\'e}fiance des citoyens am{\'e}ricains {\`a} l{\textquoteright}encontre de l{\textquoteright}{\'E}tat est profond{\'e}ment ancr{\'e}e dans une soci{\'e}t{\'e} marqu{\'e}e par les clivages partisans et une longue tradition de d{\'e}nigrement.}, url = {https://www.cairn.info/revue-francaise-d-administration-publique-2019-2-page-385.htm}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {646515, title = {L{\textquoteright}{\'e}ruption patriote: The Revolt against Dalhousie and the Petitioning Explosion in Nineteenth-Century French Canada}, journal = {Social Science History}, volume = {43}, year = {2019}, pages = {453-485}, abstract = {As much as any other site in the nineteenth century, Francophone Lower Canada saw immense waves of popular petitioning, with petitions against British colonial administration attracting tens of thousands of signatures in the 1820s. The petition against Governor Dalhousie of 1827{\textendash}28 attracted more than 87,000 names, making it one of the largest mass petitions of the Atlantic world on a per-capita scale for its time. We draw upon new archival evidence that shows the force of local organization in the petition mobilization, and combine this with statistical analyses of a new sample of 1,864 names from the anti-Dalhousie signatory list. We conclude that the Lower Canadian petitioning surge stemmed from emergent linguistic nationalism, expectations of parliamentary democracy, and the mobilization and alliance-building efforts of Patriote leaders in the French-Canadian republican movement. As elsewhere in the nineteenth-century Atlantic, the anti-Dalhousie effort shows social movements harnessing petitions to recruit, mobilize, and build cross-cultural alliances.}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2019.23}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Doris Brossard} } @article {646514, title = {U.S. Nationwide Disclosure of Industry Payments and Public Trust in Physicians}, journal = {Journal of the American Medical Association {\textendash} JAMA Network Open}, year = {2019}, url = {doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2019.1947}, author = {Pham-Kanter G, Carpenter D, Lehmann L, Mello M} } @article {646513, title = {Effect of the Public Disclosure of Industry Payments Information on Patients: Results from a Population-Based Natural Experiment}, journal = {British Medical Journal {\textendash} BMJ Open}, year = {2019}, url = {doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2018-024020}, author = {Genevieve Pham-Kanter and Daniel Carpenter and Lehmann, Lisa and Michelle Mello} } @article {604926, title = {Suffrage Petitioning as Formative Practice: American Women Presage and Prepare for the Vote, 1870-1920}, journal = {Studies in American Political Development }, volume = {32}, number = {1}, year = {2018}, month = {April 2018}, pages = {24-48}, abstract = {The American woman suffrage movement remade the U.S. Constitution and effected the broadest expansion of voting eligibility in the nation{\textquoteright}s history. Yet it did more than change laws and citizenship. It also plausibly shaped participatory patterns before and after the winning of voting rights for women. Drawing upon the idea of formative practice and reporting on a range of historical materials{\textemdash}including an original data set of 2,157 petitions sent to the U.S. Congress from 1874 to 1920 concerning women{\textquoteright}s voting rights{\textemdash}we focus on woman suffrage petitioning as both presaging the practice of voting and, in a sense, preparing tens of thousands of women for that activity. Our analyses reveal that, before 1920, suffrage petitioning activity was heightened in general and midterm election years (especially among Republican-leaning constituencies), suffrage petitioning both enabled and reflected organization in critical western states, and that post-suffrage women{\textquoteright}s turnout was immediately and significantly higher in states with greater pre-suffrage petitioning (controlling for a range of political, organizational, and demographic variables). In its claims, symbolism, habits, and temporality, suffrage petitioning differed from other petitioning in American political development and marked a formative practice for women on their way to voting.}, url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/studies-in-american-political-development/article/suffrage-petitioning-as-formative-practice-american-women-presage-and-prepare-for-the-vote-18401940/E1260F9A31EE24E8BE713D1E98736F66}, author = {Carpenter D, Resch T, Popp Z, Schneer B, Topich N} } @article {604427, title = {Paths of Recruitment: Rational Social Prospecting in Petition Canvassing}, journal = {American Journal of Political Science}, volume = {62}, number = {1}, year = {2018}, pages = {192-209}, abstract = {Petition canvassers are political recruiters. Building upon the rational prospector model, we theorize that rational recruiting strategies are dynamic (Bayesian and time-conscious), spatial (constrained by geography), and social (conditioned on relations between canvasser and prospect). Our theory predicts that canvassers will exhibit homophily in their canvassing preferences and will alternate between {\textquotedblleft}door-to-door{\textquotedblright} and {\textquotedblleft}attractor{\textquotedblright} (working in a central location) strategies based upon systematic geographical variation. They will adjust their strategies midstream (mid-petition) based upon experience. Introducing methods to analyze canvassing data, we test these hypotheses on geocoded signatory lists from two petition drives{\textemdash}a 2005{\textendash}6 anti{\textendash}Iraq War initiative in Wisconsin and an 1839 antislavery campaign in New York City. Canvassers in these campaigns exhibited homophily to the point of following geographically and politically {\textquotedblleft}inefficient{\textquotedblright} paths. In the aggregate, these patterns may exacerbate political inequality, limiting political involvement of the poorer and less educated.}, url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12305}, author = {Nall C, Schneer B, Carpenter D} } @article {604904, title = {Statutory Clarity and Regulatory Precedent on Substantial Equivalence Standards in Tobacco Governance: Implications for Understanding Sections 905 and 910 of the FSPTCA}, journal = {Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law}, volume = {42}, number = {4}, year = {2017}, author = {Carpenter D, Connolly G, Lempert L} } @article {604434, title = {Public Awareness of and Contact with Physicians Who Receive Industry Payments: A Survey}, journal = {Journal of General Internal Medicine}, volume = {32}, number = {7}, year = {2017}, author = {Pham-Kanter G, Mello M, Lehmann L, Campbell E, Carpenter D} } @article {604433, title = {Public Awareness of and Contact with Physicians Who Receive Industry Payments: A Survey}, journal = {Journal of General Internal Medicine}, volume = {32}, number = {7}, year = {2017}, author = {Pham-Kanter G, Mello M, Lehmann L, Campbell E, Carpenter D} } @article {604432, title = {Scott Gottlieb and the Credibility of U.S. Therapeutics}, journal = {The New England Journal of Medicine}, volume = {376}, number = {15}, year = {2017}, author = {Carpenter D} } @article {604431, title = {Tobacco industry response and outcomes of a ban on lights descriptors on cigarette packaging}, journal = {Tobacco Control}, year = {2017}, author = {Alpert HR, Carpenter D, Connolly GN} } @article {604907, title = {Internal Governance of Agencies: The Sieve, the Shove, the Show}, journal = {Harvard Law Review}, year = {2016}, author = {Carpenter D} } @article {604906, title = {Recruitment by Petition: American Abolitionism, French Protestantism, English Suppression}, journal = {Perspectives on Politics}, volume = {14}, number = {3}, year = {2016}, pages = {700-723}, abstract = {Why do petitions flourish when they are often denied if not ignored by the sovereigns who receive them? When activists seek to build political organizations in network-rich but information-poor environments, petitioning as institutional technology facilitates recruitment. A petition{\textquoteright}s signatory list identifies and locates individuals sympathetic to its prayer and expresses to other citizens who and how many agree with the prayer. Three historical moments{\textemdash}the explosion of antislavery petitioning in the antebellum United States, the emergence of Protestantism in sixteenth-century France, and England{\textquoteright}s suppression of petitioning after the Restoration Settlement of 1660{\textemdash}provide vivid demonstrations of the theory. A recruitment-based theory implies that petition drives mobilize as much as they express, that well-established groups and parties petition less frequently, and that the most important readers of a petition are those asked to sign it. The petition{\textquoteright}s recruitment function complements, but also transforms, its function of messaging the sovereign. Contemporary digital petitioning both routinizes and takes its force from the petition{\textquoteright}s embedded recruitment technology.}, url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/recruitment-by-petition-american-antislavery-french-protestantism-english-suppression/574441606006D23960F81868158E8FB1}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {604905, title = {Failure of Investigational Drugs in Late-Stage Clinical Development and Publication of Trial Results}, journal = {JAMA-Internal Medicine}, year = {2016}, author = {Hwang TJ, Carpenter D, Lauffenburger JC, Wang B, Franklin J, Kesselheim AS} } @article {604903, title = {Sovereignty and Survivance {\textendash} The Pathways of Native Politics}, journal = {Perspectives on Politics}, volume = {14}, number = {4}, year = {2016}, author = {Carpenter D} } @article {604911, title = {Transactional Authority and Bureaucratic Politics}, journal = {Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory}, volume = {25}, number = {1}, year = {2015}, author = {Carpenter D, Krause G} } @article {604910, title = {Paying for Innovation: Reimbursement Incentives for Novel Antibiotics}, journal = {Science Translational Medicine}, year = {2015}, author = {Hwang TJ, Carpenter D, Kesselheim AS} } @article {604909, title = {Accelerating innovation for rapid diagnostics and targeted antibacterials}, journal = {Nature Biotechnology}, volume = {33}, number = {6}, year = {2015}, author = {Hwang TJ, Powers JH, Carpenter D, Kesselheim AS} } @article {604908, title = {Substandard and falsified drugs: A threat to human and global security}, journal = {Lancet}, year = {2015}, author = {Carpenter D, Gostin L, Ndomondo-Sigonda M} } @article {412046, title = {Party Formation through Petitions: The Whigs and the Bank War of 1832 - 1834}, journal = {Studies in American Political Development}, volume = {29}, number = {2}, year = {2015}, month = {Oct 2015}, pages = {213 - 234}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Benjamin Schneer} } @article {604916, title = {Quantifying The Food and Drug Administration{\textquoteright}s Rulemaking Delays Highlights The Need For Transparency}, journal = {Health Affairs }, volume = {33}, number = {2}, year = {2014}, author = {Hwang TJ, Powers JH, Carpenter D, Kesselheim AS} } @article {604915, title = {Assessment of US pathway for approving medical devices for rare conditions}, journal = {British Medical Journal}, year = {2014}, author = {Hwang TJ, Carpenter D, Kesselheim AS} } @article {604914, title = {A Systematic Review of State and Manufacturer Physician Payment Disclosure Websites: Implications for Implementation of the Sunshine Act}, journal = {Journal of Law, Medicine \& Ethics}, volume = {42}, number = {2}, year = {2014}, author = {Hwong AR, Qaragholi N, Carpenter D, Joffe S, Campbell EG, Soleymani Lehmann L} } @article {604913, title = {Accounting for Financial Innovation and Borrower Confidence in Financial Rulemaking: Analogies from Health Policy}, journal = {Journal of Legal Studies}, volume = {43}, number = {S2}, year = {2014}, author = {Carpenter D} } @article {604912, title = {Strengths and Weaknesses in the Case for SEC Capture}, journal = {Law and Financial Markets Review}, volume = {8}, number = {3}, year = {2014}, author = {Tai L, Carpenter D} } @article {413111, title = {Studies in American Political Development}, year = {2014}, author = {Robin Einhorn and Eric Schickler and Anthony S., Chen} } @article {412066, title = {Target small firms for antibiotic innovation}, journal = {Science}, volume = {344}, number = {6187}, year = {2014}, month = {May 2014}, pages = {967 - 969}, author = {Thomas J., Swang and Daniel Carpenter and Aaron S., Kesselheim} } @article {412056, title = {When Canvassers Became Activists: Antislavery Petitioning and the Political Mobilization of American Women}, journal = {American Political Science Review}, volume = {108}, number = {3}, year = {2014}, month = {Aug 2014}, pages = {479 - 498}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Colin D. Moore} } @article {604919, title = {Can Expedited FDA Drug Approval without Expedited Follow-Up Be Trusted?}, journal = {JAMA Internal Medicine}, volume = {174}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, author = {Carpenter D} } @article {604918, title = {Time Series Analyses of the Effect of FDA Communications on Use of Prescription Weight Loss Medications}, journal = {Obesity}, year = {2013}, author = {Block JP, Choudhry NK, Carpenter DP, Fischer MA, Brennan TA, Tong AY, Matlin OS, Shrank WH} } @article {604917, title = {Keeping Tabs on Financial Innovation: Product Identifiers in Consumer Financial Regulation}, journal = {North Carolina Banking Institute Journal}, volume = {18}, year = {2013}, author = {McCoy P, Carpenter D} } @conference {412076, title = {La p{\'e}tition antiesclavagiste am{\'e}ricaine au 19eme si{\`e}cle -- Le{\c c}ons et possibilit{\'e}s de recherches comparatives}, booktitle = {P{\'e}titionner}, year = {2013}, month = {March}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @book {412071, title = {Preventing Regulatory Capture}, year = {2013}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, organization = {Cambridge University Press}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and David A., Moss} } @article {604922, title = {Reputation and Public Administration}, journal = {Public Administration Review}, volume = {72}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, author = {Carpenter D, Krause G} } @article {604921, title = {Warnings without Guidance: Patient Responses to an FDA Warning about Ezetimibe}, journal = {Medical Care}, volume = {50}, number = {6}, year = {2012}, author = {Shrank WH, Choudhry NK, Tong A, Myers J, Fischer MA, Swanton K, Slezak J, Brennan TA, Liberman JN, Moffit S, Avorn J, Carpente} } @article {604920, title = {Is Health Politics Different?}, journal = {Annual Review of Political Science}, volume = {15}, year = {2012}, author = {Carpenter D} } @article {412996, title = {Reputation and Public Administration}, journal = {Public Administration Review}, volume = {72}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, month = {15 Nov 2011}, pages = {26 - 32}, abstract = {This article examines the application of organizational reputation to public administration. Organizational reputation is defined as a set of beliefs about an organization{\textquoteright}s capacities, intentions, history, and mission that are embedded in a network of multiple audiences. The authors assert that the way in which organizational reputations are formed and subsequently cultivated is fundamental to understanding the role of public administration in a democracy. A review of the basic assumptions and empirical work on organizational reputation in the public sector identifies a series of stylized facts that extends our understanding of the functioning of public agencies. In particular, the authors examine the relationship between organizational reputation and bureaucratic autonomy.}, url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02506.x}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and George Krause} } @article {412086, title = {The Complications of Controlling Agency Time Discretion: FDA Deadlines and Postmarket Drug Safety}, journal = {American Journal of Political Science}, year = {2012}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Jacqueline Chattopadhyay and Susan Moffitt and Clayton Nall} } @article {604925, title = {Bioequivalence: The Regulatory Career of a Pharmaceutical Concept}, journal = {Bulletin of the History of Medicine}, volume = {85}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, author = {Carpenter D, Tobbell D} } @article {604924, title = {A Unique Physician Identifier for the Physician Payments Sunshine Act}, journal = {Journal of the American Medical Association}, volume = {305}, number = {19}, year = {2011}, author = {Carpenter D, Kesselheim A, Joffe S} } @article {604923, title = {Reputation and Precedent in the Bevacizumab Decision}, journal = {New England Journal of Medicine}, year = {2011}, author = {Carpenter D, Kesselheim A, Joffe S} } @article {8984, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Bioequivalence: The Regulatory Career of a Pharmaceutical Concept{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {Bulletin of the History of Medicine}, volume = {85}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {93-131}, abstract = {Generic drugs cannot be marketed without regulatory and clini- cal demonstration of {\textquotedblleft}bioequivalence.{\textquotedblright} The authors argue that the concept of {\textquotedblleft}bioequivalence{\textquotedblright} is a joint regulatory and scientific creation, not purely a tech- nical concept, and not purely a legal concept. It developed at the interstices of networks of pharmacologists, regulators, food and drug lawyers, and American and European policy makers interested in {\textquotedblleft}generic{\textquotedblright} drugs. This article provides a situated perspective on the history of bioequivalence, which emphasizes the shaping role of the state upon scientific processes, networks of regulators and scientists, and the centrality of transnational dynamics in the formation of drug regulatory standards. }, url = {doi:10.1353/bhm.2011.0024}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Dominique Tobbell} } @book {446181, title = {Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA}, series = {Princeton: Princeton University Press}, year = {2010}, note = {Awarded\ The 2011 Allan Sharlin Memorial Award\ of the Social Science History Association for Outstanding Book on Social Science History Early Reviews and Reactions:Tyler Cowen{\textquoteright}s treatment at\ Marginal RevolutionSteven Teles{\textquoteright} review in the\ Washington MonthlyJames Surowiecki{\textquoteright}s discussion in\ The New Yorker}, url = {http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9205.html}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {8990, title = {{\textquotedblleft}U.S. Pharmaceutical Innovation in an International Context{\textquotedblright} }, journal = {American Journal of Public Health}, number = {6}, year = {2010}, pages = {1075-1080}, url = {http://ajph.aphapublications.org/cgi/doi/10.2105/AJPH.2009.178491}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Salomeh Keyhani and Gerard Anderson and Paul Hebert and Steven Wang} } @article {8986, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Approval Regulation and Endogenous Consumer Confidence: Theory and an Analogies to Licensing, Safety and Financial Regulation{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {Regulation and Governance }, volume = {4}, number = {4}, year = {2010}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Justin Grimmer and Eric Lomazoff} } @article {8989, title = {Early-Entrant Protection in Approval Regulation: Theory and Evidence from FDA Drug Review}, journal = {Journal of Law Economics and Organization }, volume = {26}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, note = {e-published April 2009 at doi: 10.1093/jleo/ewp002}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Susan Moffitt and Colin Moore and Ryan Rynbrandt and Michael Ting and Ian Yohai and Evan James Zucker} } @article {8988, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Institutional Strangulation: Bureaucratic Politics and Financial Reform in the Obama Administration{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {Perspective on Politics}, volume = {8}, number = {3}, year = {2010}, pages = {825-46}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {8991, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Reputation Information and Confidence {\textendash} The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Regulation{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {Public Choice and Public Law }, year = {2010}, note = {Daniel Farber and Anne Joseph O{\textquoteright}Connell (Editors)}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {446241, title = {The Trouble with Deadlines}, year = {2009}, month = {7 Feb, 2009}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Justin Grimmer} } @inbook {8992, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Confidence Games: How Does Regulation Constitute Markets?{\textquotedblright}}, booktitle = {Towards a New Theory of Regulation}, year = {2009}, note = {Part of the Tobin Project on Economic Regulation. Part of the Tobin Project on Economic Regulation.}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, organization = {Cambridge University Press}, address = {New York }, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Edward Balleisen and David Moss} } @inbook {8994, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Regulation{\textquotedblright}}, booktitle = {The Princeton Encyclopedia of Political History }, year = {2009}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Michael Kazin} } @article {8997, title = {{\textquotedblleft}A Formal Model of Learning and Policy Diffusion{\textquotedblright} }, journal = {American Political Science Review }, volume = {102 }, number = {3}, year = {2008}, pages = {319-32}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Craig Volden and Michael Ting} } @article {8998, title = {Drug Review Deadlines and Subsequent Safety Problems}, journal = {New England Journal of Medicine }, volume = {358}, number = {13}, year = {2008}, note = {Errata and Corrected Estimates: New England Journal of Medicine 359 (1) (July 3, 2008) 95-98. Initial results presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), St. Louis, Missouri, April 2005; also presented at the FDA-NIH Management Conference, College Park, Maryland, May 2005. Selected as one of the 25 most influential research articles of 2008; Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.}, pages = {1354-61}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Evan James Zucker and Jerry Avorn} } @article {446246, title = {Deadline Effects in Regulatory Review: A Methodological and Empirical Analysis}, year = {2007}, note = {available asWorking Paper $\#$35 in the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Scholars in Health Policy Program Working Paper Series.}, month = {July 2007}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Bowers, Jake and Justin Grimmer and Susan Moffitt and Clayton Nall and Evan James Zucker} } @article {446211, title = {Dynamic Stochastic Learning in Regulatory Optimization: Deadlines and Error with Continuous and Discrete Evidence}, year = {2007}, month = {21 Apr, 2007}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Justin Grimmer} } @article {9005, title = {{\textquotedblleft}The Leaning Tower of PISA: Fundamental Problems in Ignorance-Based Theories of State Autonomy{\textquotedblright} }, journal = {Critical Review }, year = {2007}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {8999, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Policy Tragedy and the Emergence of Regulation: The Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {Studies in American Political Development }, volume = {21}, number = {2}, year = {2007}, pages = {149-180}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Gisela Sin} } @article {9000, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Regulatory Errors with Endogenous Agendas{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {American Journal of Political Science }, volume = {51}, number = {4}, year = {2007}, note = { Earlier version distributed as Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Scholars in Health Policy Working Paper $\#$30. }, pages = {835-853}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Michael Ting} } @article {9004, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Robust Action and the Strategic Use of Ambiguity in a Bureaucratic Cohort: FDA Scientists and the Investigational New Drug Regulations of 1963{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {Formative Acts: American Politics in the Making }, year = {2007}, publisher = {University of Pennsylvania Press }, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Colin D. Moore and Matt Glassman and Stephen Skowronek} } @article {9007, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Reputation Gatekeeping and the Politics of Post-marketing Drug Regulation{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {Virtual Mentor [American Medical Association] }, volume = {8}, year = {2006}, pages = {403-406}, url = {http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/16258.html }, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {9006, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Whose Deaths Matter? Mortality Identity and Attention to Disease in the Mass Media{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {Journal of Health Politics Policy and Law }, volume = {31}, number = {4}, year = {2006}, note = {Winner the 2007 Eliot Freidson Award for Best Publication Medical Sociology Section American Sociological Association. One of JHPPL{\textquoteright}s {\textquotedblleft}Top Papers of 2006{\textquotedblright} Finalist NIHCM Foundation Annual Health Care Research Award.}, pages = {729-772}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Elizabeth Armstrong and Marie Hojnacki} } @article {446206, title = {A Simple Theory of Placebo Learning with Self-Remitting Conditions}, year = {2005}, month = {4 Nov, 2005}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {9012, title = {{\textquotedblleft}The Political Logic of Regulatory Error{\textquotedblright} }, journal = {Nature Reviews {\textendash} Drug Discovery }, volume = {4}, number = {10}, year = {2005}, pages = {819-823}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Michael Ting} } @article {9009, title = {{\textquotedblleft}A Modest Proposal for Financing Postmarketing Drug Safety Studies by Augmenting FDA User Fees{\textquotedblright} }, journal = {Health Affairs {\textendash} Web Exclusive }, volume = {W5 }, number = {469}, year = {2005}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {9015, title = {{\textquotedblleft}The Evolution of National Bureaucracy in the United States{\textquotedblright}}, year = {2005}, note = {Chapter 2}, pages = {41-71}, publisher = {Oxford University Press }, address = {New York}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Joel D. Aberbach and Mark Peterson and The Institutions of American Democracy: The Executive Branch} } @workingpaper {446176, title = {A Theory of Approval Regulation}, year = {2004}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Mike Ting} } @article {446306, title = {Why Do Bigger Firms Receive Faster Drug Approvals?}, year = {2004}, note = {Prepared for presentation at the Harvard-MIT Workshop on Positive Political Economy, March 16, 2001. Currently under revision.}, month = {May 2004}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Brian Feinstein and Colin Moore and Marc Turenne and Ian Yohai and Evan James Zucker} } @article {9041, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Friends Brokers and Transitivity: Who Talks with Whom in Washington Lobbying?{\textquotedblright} }, journal = {Journal of Politics }, volume = {66}, number = {1}, year = {2004}, pages = {224-246}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Kevin Esterling and Lazer, David} } @article {9040, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Approval Times for New Drugs: Does the Source of Funding for FDA Staff Matter?{\textquotedblright} }, journal = {Health Affairs {\textendash} Web Exclusive}, volume = {W3- 618-624}, year = {2004}, note = {(Abstract available in January/February 2004 issue.) }, author = {Daniel Carpenter and A. Mark Fendrick and Michael Chernew and Dean Smith} } @article {9039, title = {{\textquotedblleft}The Political Economy of FDA Drug Approval: Processing Politics and Implications for Policy{\textquotedblright} }, journal = {Health Affairs}, volume = {23}, number = {1}, year = {2004}, pages = {52-63}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {9038, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Accelerating Approval Times for New Drugs in the U.S{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {The Regulatory Affairs Journal {\textendash} Pharma}, volume = {15}, number = {6}, year = {2004}, pages = {411-417}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and A. Mark Fendrick} } @article {9037, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Staff Resources Speed FDA Drug Review{\textquotedblright} }, journal = {Journal of Health Policy Politics and Law}, volume = {29}, number = {3}, year = {2004}, pages = {431-442}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {9034, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Gatekeeping and the FDA{\textquoteright}s Role in Human Subjects Protection{\textquotedblright} }, journal = {Virtual Mentor [American Medical Association] }, volume = {6}, year = {2004}, note = {URL at: ama-assn.org}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {9036, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Political Learning from Rare Events: Poisson Inference Fiscal Constraints and the Lifetime of Bureaus{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {Political Analysis}, volume = {12}, number = {3}, year = {2004}, pages = {201-232}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and David Lewis} } @article {9030, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Protection without Capture: Dynamic Product Approval by a Politically Responsive Learning Regulator{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {American Political Science Review }, volume = {98}, number = {4}, year = {2004}, note = {Winner [for volume] the 2006 Richard Neustadt Prize for Best Reference Work on the Presidency.}, month = {Nov 2004}, pages = {613-631}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {412986, title = {Lesson, Portraiture, Method, Myth: Richard Bensel{\textquoteright}s The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-1900}, year = {2003}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {9046, title = {{\textquotedblleft}The Impact of a Celebrity Promotional Campaign on the Use of Colon Cancer Screening: The Case of Katie Couric{\textquotedblright} }, journal = {Archives of Internal Medicine }, volume = {63}, year = {2003}, pages = {1601-1605}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Peter Cram and John Inadomi and Sandeep Vijay and A. Mark Fendrick} } @article {9042, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Information and Contact-Making in Policy Networks: A Model with Evidence from the U.S. Health Policy Domain{\textquotedblright} }, journal = {Rationality and Society }, volume = {15}, number = {4}, year = {2003}, pages = {411-440}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Lazer, David and Kevin Esterling} } @article {9043, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Executive Power in American Institutional Development{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {Perspectives on Politics}, volume = {1}, number = {3}, year = {2003}, note = {Winner of the 2000 Martha Joynt Kumar Award for Best Convention Paper relating to the Presidency delivered at the 1999 American Political Science Association meetings Atlanta.}, pages = {495-513}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Keith Whittington} } @article {9044, title = {{\textquotedblleft}The Multiple and Material Legacies of Stephen Skowronek{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {Social Science History }, volume = {27}, number = {3}, year = {2003}, pages = {465- 474}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @inbook {9050, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Why Do Bureaucrats Delay? Lessons from a Stochastic Optimal Stopping Model of Product Approval{\textquotedblright} forthcoming}, booktitle = {Scientific Approaches to Bureaucratic Politics}, year = {2003}, publisher = {University of Michigan Press}, organization = {University of Michigan Press}, address = {Ann Arbor}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Kenneth Meier and George Krause} } @article {9049, title = {Why Do Bureaucrats Delay? Lessons from a Stochastic Optimal Stopping Model of Product Approval{\textquotedblright} forthcoming}, year = {2003}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Kenneth Meier and George Krause} } @article {9047, title = {Groups the Media Agency Waiting Costs and FDA Drug Approval}, journal = {American Journal of Political Science}, volume = {46}, number = {2}, year = {2002}, note = {Winner,\ The 2001 Pi Sigma Alpha Award for Best Paper presented at the 2000 meetings of the\ MidwestPolitical Science Association\ [over 1,800 papers presented] Nominated by the Midwest Public Administration Section for the Robert\ Durr\ Award (best methodological paper, 2000 convention). Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Scholars in Health Policy Working Paper $\#$21. Replication results using shared (inverse Gaussian) frailties for primary indication, and fixed (coefficient vector) effects for sponsoring firm. Replication data for Table 1, full model. [Note: these data are intended for read to S-Plus or to STATA (Version 7.0 or later). None of the drugs, nor firms, nor primary indications, is identified. All NME data collected from FDA sources and newspaper reports by Daniel Carpenter. To replicate Table 1, Model 1 of theAJPS\ article, download these data, save into STATA 7.0 or later, and then redefine the set variables (that is, rename _t, _t0, and _d as something else). Then\ stset\ the data (declare {\textquotedblleft}acttime{\textquotedblright} to be the survival variable, and the variable previously named {\textquotedblleft}_d{\textquotedblright} to be the failure or inverse-censoring variable. Then issue the following command: streg\ hcomm\ hfloor\ scomm\ sfloor\ prespart\ demhsmaj\ demsnmaj\ orderent\ stafcder\ prevgenx\ lethal deathrt1 hosp01\ hospdisc\ hhosleng\ acutediz\ orphdum\ mandiz01 femdiz01 peddiz01\ natregnatregsq\ wpnoavg3 vandavg3 condavg3, dist(lognormal) frailty(invg) Replication data for Tables 2 \& 3, reduced models\ [Note: None of the drugs,\ nor firms, nor\ primary indications, is identified. All NME data collected from FDA sources and newspaper reports by Daniel Carpenter. Also, I just recently produced this reduced-model data and cannot yet retrieve the exact estimates reported in\ AJPS\ 2002, though the ones you get here are very close. It may be that I updated the data after the galleys went to\ AJPS, without saving the original data (with 1 or 2 flaws). If so, I should have documented this more carefully. I regret the error.]}, pages = {490-505}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @book {8981, title = {The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Networks, Reputations and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862- 1928}, year = {2001}, note = {Winner, The 2002 Gladys Kammerer Award of the American Political Science Association, for the best book on U.S. national policy published in 2001. Winner, The 2002 Charles Levine Award of the International Political Science Association, for the best book on public administration and public policy published in 2001.}, url = {http://press.princeton.edu/titles/7092.html}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {9048, title = {{\textquotedblleft}The Political Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy: A Reply to Kernell{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {Studies in American Political Development }, volume = {15}, number = {1}, year = {2001}, pages = {113-122}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @conference {9052, title = {Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Scholars in Health Policy Working Paper $\#$21}, booktitle = {2000 Midwest Political Science Association}, year = {2000}, note = {Winner The Pi Sigma Alpha Award for Best Paper of the 2000 Midwest Political Science Association annual national convention. Nominated by the Midwest Public Administration Section for the Robert Durr Award (best methodological paper 2000 convention).}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {9056, title = {{\textquotedblleft}State Building through Reputation Building: Policy Innovation and Coalitions of Esteem at the Post Office 1883-1912{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {Studies in American Political Development }, volume = {14}, number = {2}, year = {2000}, pages = {121-55}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {9059, title = {{\textquotedblleft}State Building through Reputation Building: Policy Innovation and Coalitions of Esteem at the Post Office 1883-1912{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {Studies in American Political Development }, volume = {14}, number = {2}, year = {2000}, pages = {121-55}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {9061, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Stochastic Prediction and Estimation of Nonlinear Political Durations: An Application to the Lifetime of Bureaus{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {Political Complexity}, year = {2000}, publisher = {University of Michigan Press }, address = {Ann Arbor}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {9058, title = {{\textquotedblleft}What is the Marginal Value of Analytic Narratives?{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {Social Science History }, volume = {24}, number = {4}, year = {2000}, pages = {653-67}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {9062, title = {{\textquotedblleft}From Patronage to Policy: The Centralization Campaign in Iowa Post Offices 1880-1910{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {Annals of Iowa }, year = {1999}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {9063, title = {{\textquotedblleft}The Strength of Weak Ties in Lobbying: Evidence from Health Care Politics in the United States{\textquotedblright} }, journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics }, volume = {10}, number = {4}, year = {1998}, pages = {417-44}, author = {Daniel Carpenter and Kevin Esterling and Lazer, David} } @article {9064, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Centralization and the Corporate Metaphor in Executive Departments 1880-1928{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {Studies in American Political Development }, volume = {12}, number = {1}, year = {1998}, pages = {106-147}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} } @article {9065, title = {{\textquotedblleft}Adaptive Signal Processing Hierarchy and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation{\textquotedblright}}, journal = {American Political Science Review }, volume = {90}, number = {2}, year = {1996}, note = {Winner of The Herbert Kaufman Award for Best Paper presented in the Public Administration Section, American Political Science Association annual meetings, August 1992, Chicago. Winner of the Best Paper Award, Executive Politics Section, American Political Science Association annual meetings, August 1992, Chicago.}, pages = {283-302}, author = {Daniel Carpenter} }